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Searching for the Rule of Law in the Wake of 
Communism 
George P. Fletcher* 
Ed itor's note-Professor Fletcher presented this paper as a 
speech on February 22, 1991, at a symposium held at Brigham 
Young University. 
Of all the dreams that drive men and women into the 
streets, the "rule of law" is the most curious. We have a pretty 
good idea of what we mean by "free markets" and "democratic 
elections." But legality and the "rule of law" are ideals that are 
opaque even to legal philosophers. Thus, we have reason to 
puzzle whether political changes in Eastern Europe represent a 
renewed commitment to the rule of law. What constitutes living 
under the rule of law after Communism? What would count as 
achieving "a-state-based-on-law"-to use an expression popular 
in the last days of Soviet Communism? 
Rather than approach these questions theoretically, I want 
to attempt to answer them with some case studies taken 
directly from the recent pages of post-Communist Hungarian 
political life. Considering these examples will give us a 
foundation to conclude by reflecting on the virtues and vices 
associated with the rule of law. The three case studies that will 
engage us will be the taxi strike in the fall of 1990, a complex 
decision whether to  prosecute someone who violated the law in 
the name of democratic values, and the invalidation of capital 
punishment by the Hungarian Constitutional Court.' What 
* Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia University School of 
Law. 
1. Judgment of Oct. 24, 1990 (The Death Penalty Case), Allsotm6nybirbAg 
[Constitutional Law Court] 107 1990 MAGYAR KOZLONY W . 1  (Hungarian Gazette) 
(Hung.) [hereinafter !h Death P e d t y  Case] (unofficial translation on file at J. 
Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; pinpoint citations will be to 
the unofficial translation [hereinalter U.T.]). 
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these specific occurrences have to do with the rule of law will 
become clear as the discussion proceeds. 
It is worth beginning with the taxi strike since it 
represents one of the most unusual phenomena of post- 
Communist politics. On Thursday night, October 25, 1990, the 
Hungarian government made a sudden announcement to  
increase the price of gas. The new prices would be slightly 
higher than in Austria, Hungary's closest Western neighbor. 
The price increase came as an obvious consequence of tensions 
in the Gulf, price hikes in the world market for oil, and the 
Soviets' move to shut off the spigot of subsidized gas that 
flowed freely when Hungary was a dutiful colony. Although the 
price hike did not have as drastic an impact as Yeltsin's 
economic shock therapy in Moscow, it was Hungary's first 
direct experience with the capitalist idea that consumers must 
pay the real (unsubsidized) price of the goods they buy. 
The taxi drivers were upset not only by the price increase, 
but by the government's apparent duplicity in planning the 
move. Prior to the price hike, the government had repeatedly 
promised not to raise the price of gas. The sudden increase was 
designed to  catch people off guard while they were still 
exuberant after having celebrated their national epic, the 
abortive 1956 revolution, on October 23. With several days off 
from work, most people were in a good mood. This was the first 
time since the transition to  democracy that the Hungarians 
had openly and joyfully celebrated the passionate agony of 
1956. 
In 1990, however, it was not tanks, but taxi cabs that 
clogged the streets and bridges of Budapest. Within a few 
hours after the government announced the price increase, the 
taxi drivers had managed to shut down the major traffic 
arteries in the city. They had parked their taxies on all the 
major bridges, and had thrown up blockades around the city. 
Spontaneous cooperation among the taxi drivers and private 
tmck drivers all over the country generated similar blockades 
in provincial cities. 
In the fall of 1990, I was in Budapest as a visiting 
professor at the local law school. I woke up that fateful Friday 
without advance warning of the strike. From my balcony 
overlooking the Danube, I noticed a large crowd milling around 
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the Szabadsdghid -the "Freedom Bridge" leading from the old 
market in Pest across the murky blue river to the palatial 
Gellert Hotel in Buda. I went out among the crowd. "Strike" 
was the word on the lips of the angry drivers hanging out by 
their cars blocking the bridge. 
Events on F'riday began to hint that this was more than a 
strike. The drivers had cordoned off the airport in Budapest. 
Unless foreign businessmen were willing to walk the last few 
miles to the airport, they were better off sitting on their 
suitcases in the lobbies of luxury hotels. This rag-tag collection 
of apolitical, tough-talking guys also managed to close the 
border to Austria. As in 1956, the only way to cross the border 
was to go through the fields and bypass the official checkpoints. 
Business came to a standstill and shops closed early. The 
subway, however, was still running under the river. 
Commuters could get home even if they lived and worked on 
opposite sides of the river and even if streetcars and private 
cars could not cross the Danube. The crowded subway stations 
became rumor mills. Reports began to circulate that food 
supplies were running low, that the hospitals could not receive 
deliveries of medicine. No one knew what was going to happen. 
The government was a fkagile expression of a democratic 
order-would it fail this first test? 
Walking the streets of Budapest and confronting 
barricades at key intersections, I had an eerie sense of being in 
Paris in  1968. Could this lead to a general strike? Would the  
opposition parties exploit the government's vulnerability? 
Newspapers started appearing in special editions. The leaders 
of the leading half-dozen political parties started speaking out, 
but in muted tones. The government itself tried to rally support 
by staging a counter-demonstration. But the leading opposition 
parties, the Free Democrats and the Young Democrats, did 
nothing to exploit the situation. Their attitude was to keep 
their distance, watch what was going on, and urge a peaceful 
resolution. The will of Paris '68 was missing; no new alliances 
were forming, no revolutionary thrust. 
On Saturday, October 27th, the mood began to stabilize. 
Standstill became the norm. Though the streets were still 
blockaded, the crisp fall day invited strolling. Budapest came 
out into the streets. Baby carriages and bicycles took over the 
lanes normally clogged with polluting vehicles. My sense on 
"Freedom Bridge" was that most people were beginning to 
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enjoy "sticking it" to the government. As one working man told 
me, That's what those thieves deserve." Then came the news 
that the police chief of Budapest had announced that if the 
government ordered intervention, he would resign. 
'What is going on?" I thought to myself as I sat in the hot 
baths at the Gell6rt pool and tried to engage other Hungarians 
in conversation about the events swirling outside. One group of 
workers seized control over the major resources of the city and 
everyone seemed to applaud. At one level it seemed like an act 
of violence that met with general approval. Other citizens were 
deprived of the right to use the bridges, yet they did not 
complain. They did not insist that labor be kept in its place. 
Nevertheless, there was no doubt in my mind that if, in the 
United States, the Teamsters tried to shut down the bridges to 
Manhattan, the police would immediately don their battle gear. 
But this was Budapest, not New York. The enemy is not 
organized labor, but organized government. The closest analogy 
to the taxi strike, as I see it, is a 1960s style college sit-in. The 
taxi drivers protested the gas hike in much the same way that 
American students protested the Vietnam war by closing down 
universities. The government was understood in the minds of 
Hungarians as university administrations were understood in 
the minds of students-as the symbol of all authority. The 
drivers "parked in" on the bridge; they ceased doing "business 
as usual." Their fellow denizens thought it was just fine to  
make life M c u l t  for the parental surrogates called the 
Government. 
Some intellectuals began to speak of the "park-inm2 as an 
act of civil disobedience. But acts of civil disobedience raise 
fundamental issues of right and wrong. There was no moral 
issue at stake in the taxi strike. This was a bread and butter 
question. When I buttonholed people and asked, 'Why 
shouldn't taxis simply raise their rates to offset the gas price 
increase?" the typical response was, "But then no one could 
afford to use taxis." This is the logic of those who still d o  not 
accept the vicissitudes of capitalism. As of 1990, Hungarians 
still looked to their government as their providers, as 
guarantors of their welfare. 
On Sunday, the strike leaders entered into negotiations 
with the government. Remarkably, the negotiations were 
2. "Park-in" is my term, not theirs. 
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broadcast, non-stop, on Hungarian television. Citizens sat 
glued to their sets with the rapt attention Americans reserve 
for sexual harassment hearings. It appeared as though the 
conflicting sides were reaching an agreement in front of the 
television cameras. The meeting was then suspended for about 
an hour; the parties came back and announced a compromise 
that would temporarily lower the price of gas as taxi strikers 
went back to work and life returned to normal. 
What do these events tell us about the rule of law? Our 
first reaction to this situation might be that these taxi strikers 
obviously violated the rights of ordinary citizens. The minimal 
context of the rule of law is that the state enforces and protects 
the quotidian rights of ordinary people. In the West, no one 
would tolerate a labor organization imposing that kind of 
tertiary effect upon citizens not involved in the labor dispute. 
At the time, I was inclined to think that the indulgence 
displayed toward the strikes reflected an insufficient 
appreciation by the Hungarian authorities of the legal 
framework required for peaceful labor disputes. In effect, the 
government allowed the entire society to be held hostage to the 
demands of a small group of workers. The rule of law requires, 
at a minimum, that the law be enforced. The Hungarian 
government chose not to  do so. 
My impression was that very few people in Budapest cared 
about the symbolic importance of maintaining the proper legal 
framework in a dispute between a small group of driver- 
citizens and the government as oil supplier. The Hungarians 
were more concerned with taboos other than breaching the rule 
of law. No one wanted another violent confrontation on the 
streets of Budapest. Having just observed the anniversary of 
the 1956 uprising, everyone was horrified by the thought of 
blood flowing once again on the banks of the Danube. Using 
force to open the bridges was simply out of the question. 
There is much to be learned from this episode. First, it 
seems that the rule of law hardly makes sense in a situation in 
which the citizenry still sees itself as negotiating with their 
government as employees negotiate with management. Alas, 
this is the legacy of communism and central planning. The 
Party did indeed function as the management of Hungary, Inc. 
Moreover, .the round-table discussions leading to democratic 
elections perpetuated the problem by carrying forward the 
mentality of employees negotiating benefits from their masters. 
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But in a centrally planned economy and controlled society, it is 
hard to think otherwise. 
The rule of law, it seems, requires a vision of government 
closer to the liberal theory of the state as a disinterested 
arbiter. The states' officials must be above the conflicts that 
lend themselves to regulation under law. So long as the 
government-as sole supplier of gas-is a party to disputes, 
one cannot expect the matter to be resolved under a neutral 
standard called law. 
Also, the rule of law requires governmental distance in 
another sense. The state cannot enforce the law consistently 
and even-handedly if it thinks of itself as a surrogate parent 
bearing ultimate responsibility for its citizens' welfare. That 
kind of indulgence shown by college administrations in the late 
19608, and by the Hungarian government in 1990, reflects an 
identity with the interests of the citizenry rather than the kind 
of distance required for the neutral arbitration of disputes. The 
Hungarian government and the masses on the streets shared a 
common interest in avoiding a repetition of past traumas, and 
this common interest weighed more heavily on the government 
than its commitment to secure the rights of citizens to free 
access to the streets and bridges. 
The connection between the rule of law and fiill 
enforcement of the law (at least the criminal law) is revealed in 
the classic dispute surrounding prosecutorial discretion. We in 
the United States have come to accept prosecutorial discretion 
as normal and, as some might say, inevitable in a legal system 
administered by people, not machines. Yet the dispute about 
full enforcement is still very much alive on the European 
Continent. The opposing positions are captured in the German 
phrases Legalitatsprinzip (full enforcement) and 
Opportunitatsprinzip (discretionary or "opportunistic" 
enforcement). Note the linguistic connection between the notion 
of full enforcement and the concept of legality (Legalitat). 
German legal theory maintains a commitment to the 
Legalitatsprinzip, the Legality Principle. 
One of the implications of a commitment to the 
Legalitatsprinzip is that prosecutors may not make special 
deals with particular suspects. Legal systems committed to  
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legality, the rule of law, should be chary of "crown 
witnessesm-granting immunity in order to induce the 
testimony of some suspects against others. Deliberately not 
prosecuting offends the principle of equality before the law and 
in that sense breaches the principle of legality. According to the 
"Opportunity Principle," however, the interests of law 
enforcement, and even individualized justice, sometimes 
mandate discriminating uses of power. In other words, the 
criteria of expediency and compassion may sometimes outweigh 
the demands of legality. 
The conflict between the principles of full and discretionary 
enforcement came to a head in Hungary's transition to 
democratic rule. The occasion was the prosecution of Jozsef 
V6gv&i, a onetime loyal officer of the Hungarian Secret 
Service, who changed sides during the 1989 Revolution. On 
Christmas day 1989, V6gv&i invited a television crew from 
Fekete Doboz-an alternative TV group-into the inner sancta 
of the Secret Service building in Budapest. The group filmed 
files and other secret corners of the operation and showed the 
film on television. The resulting scandal came to be known as 
"Dunagate." Dissident groups celebrated the scandal, for 
V6gv&i's deception gave them access to the Communist Party's 
fdes on the democratic opposition. 
Hungary's first free elections took place in February 1990, 
three months aRer V6gv&i breached his official duties as  an 
intelligence officer. There is little doubt that his acts 
constituted criminal violations under the criminal code then in 
force. And indeed, if we may abstract from the political conflict 
of the moment, his acts should in principle constitute a 
criminal offense under any system of criminal law. Every legal 
system, whether democratic or communist, maintains a secret 
service. Breaching the rigors of official secrecy for the sake of a 
good political motive is hardly a defense. I t  seems that V6gvsri 
should have been prosecuted and convicted. 
The Communist chief prosecutor decided, however, not to 
prosecute. This was a decision based not so much on 
expediency, but on a recognition of V6gvsri's good faith, and 
perhaps on the perception that the changing political climate 
rendered him more of a hero than a villain. Yet in June 1990, 
the newly constituted democratic government appointed a new 
chief prosecutor, Kdlman Gyorgyi, who was a distinguished 
professor of criminal procedure well schooled in German 
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literature on the imperative of the "Legality Principle." 
Paradoxically, the new democratically-minded chief prosecutor 
decided that he must prosecute V6gvhi. The principle of 
legality required that he bring to trial a man who had served 
the cause of the democratic transition. 
The case finally came to trial in the fall of 1990, and the 
process revealed a curious mixture of Soviet and Western legal 
ideas. On the one hand, the decision to prosecute reflected a 
yearning to  identify with the principles of legality that 
prevailed in the West, or at least in those few countries 
officially committed to the "Legality Principle." Yet many of the 
legal arguments internal to the case reflected the ongoing 
influence of Soviet legal theory. V6gvh-i'~ defense was that his 
conduct was justified because, as Soviet lawyers were wont to 
say, it was not "socially dangerous." The underlying principle of 
this defense is that the ultimate criterion of legality (la& 
and unlawful behavior) is not the nominal violation of the law, 
but generating a threat to  the legitimate interests of society. 
According to this theory, V6gvii.15 was aiding the democratic 
movement and indeed the movement had won. In what sense 
could one say that his conduct constituted a danger to the 
legitimate interests of the emerging democratic order? 
The answer to the question depends, of course, on how we 
define V6gvsri's conduct. If we look just at what he did, namely 
reveal official secrets, his conduct was surely criminal 
regardless of his motives. If we focus on this conduct in context, 
however, it takes on the appearance of justifiable civil 
disobedience. The military court that heard the case3 cannot be 
criticized for failing to  resolve this conundrum. The prosecution 
ended in November 1990, with a compromise verdict. The court 
issued an official reprimand of V6gv&ri's conduct, an informal 
sanction short of an official convi~tion.~ 
The very institution of an official reprimand reflects the 
sumival of communist-inspired paternalistic thinking in the 
Hungarian legal system. The reprimand reflects the 
authorities' disapproval of conduct that is not demonstrably 
unlawful. Oddly, despite the differences between the V6gv6ri 
affair and the taxi strike, both instantiate, in different ways, 
the paternalistic dimension of the legal system. The 
3. As an intelligence officer, Vbgvtiri was under military jurisdiction. 
4. Because this is a trial court case, a citation is unavailable. 
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government, as parent, censures its citizens without a legal 
conviction; and the citizens, in turn, regard the government as 
the symbol of all coercive power. It will take years of reform to 
eliminate this way of thinking from a society that despised but 
became used to  "big brother* in government. 
A third event, which occurred in the fall of 1990, raises 
still other questions concerning the rule of law and its promise 
in Eastern Europe. In October, just before the taxi strike, the 
newly created Hungarian Constitutional Court heard the 
complaint of Dr. Tibor Horviith, a law professor from Miskolc, 
challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty in 
H~ngary .~  The Hungarian Court is modeled after the German 
Constitutional Court and consists of ten members, virtually all 
of whom are professorial types appointed from research or 
teaching positions. Each of the Court's members serves a term 
of nine years. Significantly, these members have had to 
confront and resolve more controversial cases than the United 
States Supreme Court assayed in its first hundred years. This 
is partly because the Court's jurisdiction includes the "abstract 
review" of statutes on their face without the requirement of a 
specific case controversy. The decision on capital punishment 
was one of the most dramatic uses of this "abstract review." 
A. The Court's Decision 
Sitting in the courtroom on October 24, 1990, I was taken 
aback by two features of the oral argument. First, I was sur- 
prised that there was no discussion and certainly no serious 
debate about the issue that would be most important to us, 
namely the problem of the Court's deference to  the democrati- 
cally-elected political branch. Second, the hearing seemed to 
rely, more than in Anglo-American practice, on the opinions of 
expert witnesses. Court-appointed experts were asked to ex- 
pound on the merits of capital punishment. The original plan 
was to  appoint at least one expert against and one expert for 
capital punishment. It turned out that all three appointed 
experts spoke against capital punishment. 
5. The Death Penalty Case, Alkotm6nybirb6g [Constitutional Law Court] 107 
1990 MK., U.T. 1, 1 (Hung. 1990). 
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One of the experts, An&& Saj6: reported on American 
studies concerning the deterrent effect of the death penalty. 
However, it would be difficult to say that these experts were 
addressing an issue that lent itself to resolution as a matter of 
neutral scientific inquiry. The fact that the experts were in- 
vited and that all three lined up against the death penalty, 
gave one a sense for which way the ideological tide was turn- 
ing. The Court broke for lunch, returned, and, within an hour, 
declared the death penalty invalid on its face. The vote was 
nine t o  one,' and the single dissenting vote focused on a proce- 
dural issue.' 
On the merits, the conflict should have been more contro- 
versial. This was a unique event in constitutional history. No 
other Court, anywhere in the world, had categorically and 
irreversibly outlawed society's oldest form of punishment. 
Moreover, there were no obvious abuses of capital punishment 
in Hungary. Unlike the former Soviet Union, which retained 
the supreme penalty for a wide range of offenses, including 
embezzlement of state property and a politicized version of 
treason, Hungary was relatively progressive. The death penalty 
was reserved only for various forms of aggravated homicide: 
burglary resulting in death,'' genocide," other life-threaten- 
ing, highly dangerous acts, such as terrorist acts12 and hijack- 
ing,13 and certain military offenses committed in wartime." 
All of these offenses, or  almost all of them, would pass muster 
under American constitutional standards as the kind of offens- 
es that render the death penalty permissible. As might be ex- 
pected, the vast majority of the Hungarian population strongly 
supports the death penalty. Unless the Hungarian people are 
totally out of touch with standards of civilized conduct (and 
many reformers think they, as well as the American public and 
judicial system, are indeed out of touch), the legal debate and 
6. Saj6 was then absent, teaching in the United States. One of the clerks 
read the expertise. 
7. The Death Penalty Case, 107 1990 MK, U.T. at 10. 
8. See infia text accompanying notes 43-47. 
9. BONTETO T~~RVI~NYK~NYV [BTK.](Penal Code) art. 166, $2 (Hung.). 
10. Id. art. 158, $ 2. 
11. Id. art. 155, $ 1. 
12. Id. art. 261, $ 2. 
13. Id. art. 262, $ 2. 
14. Id. art. 343, $ 4; art. 346, 8 1; art. 347. 
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the vote of the judges in Budapest should have more closely 
reflected the views of the electorate. 
If there were a clear provision on point in the reformed 
Hungarian Constitution, as amended on October 23, 1989, one 
might see the judges as acting under a simple constitutional 
imperative. But there was no relevant clause that could gener- 
ate a knockout syllogism against the death penalty. The Hun- 
garian Constitution contains nothing more compelling than the 
vague language of the American Eighth Amendment prohibit- 
ing "cruel and unusual p~nishment."'~ Article 54(1) of the 
amended Hungarian Constitution provides: 
In the Hungarian Republic everyone has the inherent right to 
life and human dignity of which no one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived. And no one shall be subject to torture or to cruel 
and inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. And no 
one shall be subject without his free consent to medical or sci- 
entific experiment.'' 
The key phrase in this provision proved to be "arbitrarily 
deprived." A plurality of Justices on the United States Supreme 
Court have thought that capital punishment decisions in our 
courts are excessively discretionary and arbitrary in that 
sense." The Hungarian judges, however, had a different sense 
of the word in mind. They were concerned not with the arbi- 
trariness inherent in the process, but rather with the substan- 
tive arbitrariness that issues from not having a good reason to 
engage in a particular practice.18 Their claim was that the 
death penalty has no sound, supporting reason. If the death 
penalty has no sound, supporting reason, the argument follows, 
it must be viewed as arbitrary. If the death penalty is arbi- 
trary, an individual executed under a death sentence is arbi- 
trarily deprived of his or her life. 
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, . . . nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). 
16. A MAGYAR K~zTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 54, $ 1 (Hung.) 
(emphasis added). 
17. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
18. The Death Penalty Case, Alkotmbybir6s6g [Constitutional Law Court] 107 
1990 MK., U.T. 1, 7 (Hung. 1990). 
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B. Possible Reasons for the Court's Decision 
Now how would one conclude that the death penalty has 
no sound, supporting reason? The majority of the Judges limit- 
ed their focus to the concept of deterrence and its inadequa- 
cies.'' It is fairly easy to cast doubt on the statistics support- 
ing deterrence as a rationale for the death penalty. If deter- 
rence is the only rational basis for the death penalty, then it 
would not be far-fetched to conclude that executing murders for 
this factually unsubstantiated purpose was arbitrary. 
Of course, the death penalty was not originally established 
because people thought-apparently, incorrectly for all these 
years-that executing some would deter others. If there was 
ever a point to the death penalty, it is that retributive justice 
requires that the norm against killing be vindicated by turning 
the crime back on the criminal, making him suffer as he made 
his victim suffer. The biblical provision mandating a "life for 
1 . . . Eye for eye, tooth for tootha0 was in fact interpreted, 
a t  least in the Jewish tradition, to  require monetary equiva- 
lence rather than a re-creation of the crime on the body of the 
~ffender.~' Yet in Western philosophical thought, notably in 
Kant and in Hegel, the principle of equivalence came to be a 
stable component in our thinking about just punishment. Nine 
of the ten Judges on the Hungarian Constitutional Court ig- 
nored the retributive justification for capital punishment. Lim- 
iting their focus to deterrence and its inadequacies, they con- 
cluded, without much ado, that the death penalty was arbitrary 
and therefore un~onstitutional.~~ 
The one Judge who recognized and endorsed the retribu- 
tive rationale for punishment, AndrAs Szab6, concluded that 
even under this standard the death penalty was arbitraqca3 
Several points in his opinion are instructive. He argues first 
that there is no reason to  privilege any particular theory of 
punishment in the Constitution.% There is no reason to sup- 
19. Id., U.T. at 9. 
20. Exodus 21:23-24(KingJames). 
21. See the Symposium on Lex Talionis, 2 [I] SVARA: JOURNAL OF PHILOSO- 
PHY, LAW, AND JUDAISM, 45-71 (1991). 
22. The Death Penalty Case, 107 1990 MK, U.T. at 6-8. 
23. Id,  U.T. at 35 (Szab6, J., concurring). 
24. Id., U.T. at 36. 
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pose that either deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation is 
mandated in the national charter. The proper interpretation of 
the criminal law, including the death penalty, is, aRer all, a 
philosophical problem. It cannot be resolved by an act of leg- 
islative will. Secondly, Szab6 reasons that privileging deter- 
rence as a constitutional rationale for punishment would call 
into question not only the death penalty, but the entire system 
of criminal law?' There is no reason to think that imprison- 
ment is more effective than the death penalty as a deterrent. 
Article 54 prohibits the arbitrary deprivation not only of life, 
but of human dignity." Therefore, if the death penalty arbi- 
trarily deprives an offender of life, imprisonment arbitrarily 
deprives him of his dignity. This is a very ingenious maneuver 
against the dominant reasoning of the Court. 
Judge Szab6's application of the retributive principle to the 
case of capital punishment is less compelling. His argument 
begins with this premise: The principle of equivalent punish- 
ment is designed to  restore the moral order disturbed by the 
crime.27 He infers that the only way to understand this pro- 
cess of restoration in the modern world is to view it not meta- 
physically, but as a symbolic process." Therefore, the maxi- 
mum punishment justified as retribution would be the degree 
of punishment understood by the public as a sufficient response 
to the crime. Szab6 then makes a logical leap. He reasons that 
because long terms of imprisonment would be sufficient, sym- 
bolically, to restore the moral order, the death penalty is un- 
necessary.2g Hence, according to Szab6, the death penalty is 
excessive and arbitrary. 
It is difficult to know why the Hungarian Judges did not 
engage in more vigorous debate about the retributive rationale 
for punishment. It may be that the Soviet influence on the 
Hungarian legal culture was greater than the Hungarian law- 
yers would like to admit. According to Soviet legal philosophy, 
with its instrumental and utilitarian focus, retribution is not 
an acceptable purpose of criminal law. 
25. Id., U.T. at 36-37. 
26. A MAGYAR KGzTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 54, 3 1 (Hung.). 
27. The Death Penalty Case, 107 1990 MK, U.T. at 37 (Szabb, J., concurring). 
28. Id., U.T. at 37-38. 
29. Id., U.T. at 39. 
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More significant than the covert Soviet influence, however, 
may have been the attention paid to certain international cove- 
nants and the respect they detail for human rights, including 
the right t o  life. Article 54 of the Hungarian Constitution is 
almost a verbatim adaptation of Articles 6(1) and 7 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political  right^.^' An 
analogous provision is found in the European Convention on Hu- 
man Rightse3' Significantly, the Hungarian documents add the 
protection of human dignity to the protection of human life 
found in the international documents. 
However valuable the right to life may be, there is nothing 
in these antecedent international documents that outlaws capi- 
tal punishment. On the contrary, they are all drafted to recog- 
nize an exception for the world's oldest form of punishment. 
For example, the remainder of article 6 in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights details the way in which 
the death penalty may be appropriately a~plied.5~ And the 
European Convention on Human Rights explicitly recognizes 
that one may be sentenced to death and executed according to 
the judgments of a c0urt.5~ So far as I know, no international 
document flatly prohibits the death penalty. It is true that 
voluntary protocols to both the International Covenant and the 
European Convention require subscribing states to forswear 
death as a sanction, but protocols, it is worth repeating, are not 
binding on member states? Great Britain, Belgium and other 
respectable states have so far refused to signs5 
The political maneuvering connected to Hungary's entry 
into the Council of Europe may also have had something to do 
with the death penalty decision, or at least with the inescap- 
30. Compare A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 54, Q 1 
(Hung.) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 
arts. 6(1) & 7, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter International Covenant]. 
31. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen- 
tal Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 1, Q 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European 
Convention]. 
32. International Covenant, supra note 31, art. 6, #Q 2-6. 
33. European Covention, supra note 32, art. 2, Q 1. 
34. Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIAL 538 (1983) [herein- 
after Protocol No. 61; Second Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/35/L.75, at 3-5 [hereinaf'ter Second Proto- 
col]. 
35. See Protocol No. 6, supm note 35, at 541; Second Protocol, supra note 35, 
at 3-5. 
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able sense that professional opposition to the decision was 
weaker than it should have been. In 1990, the Hungarian gov- 
ernment was engaged in serious negotiations about its entry 
into the Council of Europe. This was a siecant aspiration for 
political leaders in Budapest, as it is for every Central Europe- 
an government. Rumor has it that the negotiators from the 
Council of Europe demanded four changes in Hungarian law as 
a condition for entry into the Council of Europe. The first 
change was the establishment of an independent judiciary. The 
second change was the establishment of freedom of the press. 
The third was the reduction of pre-trial detention time-the 
period between arrest and bringing the suspect before a 
magistrate-from five days to three. The fourth change was the 
abolition of capital punishment. 
The first three demands were plausible; all were required 
by international documents. The first two are relatively 
unproblematic. First, at one level, "independence" of the judi- 
ciary requires merely that politicians cease interfering in the 
administration of justice. Second, freedom of the press always 
existed in Hungary in the sense that censorship under the 
Communists was self-censorship, not control by an official body 
charged with keeping the press "politically correct." The third 
demand of reducing pre-trial detention required a minor revi- 
sion in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
But where does the Council of Europe get the authority to 
tell Hungarians that they should abolish capital punishment? 
Though the international documents do not require abolition, 
one might argue that the policy consensus of European govern- 
ments favors an end to the death penalty. In addition, as to the 
formerly totalitarian governments, abolition represents a prin- 
cipled break with the past. The firing squad has become a sym- 
bol of totalitarian government. Some democratic societies might 
use the death penalty responsibly, but arguably every totalitar- 
ian society invokes the death penalty, sometimes responsibly, 
sometimes as an instrument of terror. Therefore, a transition to 
democracy might sensibly require the abandonment of symbols 
of repression, such as the state's efforts to make decisions of 
life and death. 
Whether the Council of Europe actually made this demand 
on Hungary remains disputed. I know some people who vigor- 
ously claim first hand knowledge of the negotiators' demands. 
Whether or not the demand was actually articulated, and if 
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articulated, whether or not the Judges on the Constitutional 
Court knew about it, there is little doubt that the symbolic 
significance of abolition moved the Judges to think that by 
stretching their analysis of "arbitrariness," they were acting in 
the name of the new democratic Constitution. 
This self-profding of the Court is nowhere more evident 
than in the concuning opinion by the President of the Court, 
Lhzlo S61y0m.~~ Judge S6lyom takes the extreme position 
that the right to life is absolute:' and that no purpose, no 
countervailing value, could justify the death penalty. S6lyom's 
analysis of the right to life bears the earmarks of the German 
1975 abortion case, which holds abortion on demand invalid on 
the ground that the fetus has a right to life.38 Yet the leap 
from a right to life to an absolute r ightone that never admits 
of justified exceptions-is great indeed. The major counter- 
example to the right to life is justifiable self-defense, recognized 
in virtually every legal system of the world. In the interest of 
"absolutizing" the right to life, S6lyom disputes whether self-de- 
fense, under the conditions required for the defense, really 
'3ustifies" the taking of life.3g He submits that self-defense is 
never really more than an excuse and thus does not undermine 
the proposition that intentional killing is always wrong. 
Needless t o  say, this interpretation of self-defense would 
fail to account for a number of assumed principles, such as the 
right of strangers to come to the aid of the victim. If self-de- 
fense were merely an excuse, there would be no basis for per- 
mitting intervention on the side of one party or the other. It 
would help S6lyom's case to invoke the German doctrine of 
rechtsfreiem Raum, a theory which holds that in some conflicts 
there is no right and no wrong; when life is pitted against life, 
the influence of the law comes t o  a halt, anything goes. If that 
were the case, strangers could intervene on behalf of aggressors 
as well as victims. That implication should give us pause. 
S6lyom's philosophical slips are the tribute his views pay 
for the "correct" democratic position that the value of life must 
36. The Death Penalty Case, Alkotrn&nybir6s@ [Constitutional Law Court] 107 
1990 MK., U.T. 1, 14 (Hung. 1990). 
37. Id., U.T. at 30-32. 
38. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht [federal constitutional 
court], 39 BVerfGE 1 (F.R.G.). 
39. The Death Penalty Case, 107 1990 MK, U.T. at 33-35 (S6lyom, J., concur- 
ring). 
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be taken very seriously. It is true that we should revere life, 
but we should also revere principles of justice that justify kill- 
ing in self-defense and even, as Kant and Hegel would argue, 
executing criminals in the name of justice. Kant's philosophy is 
foundational in generating our modern notions of respect for 
life and human dignity. Yet in Kant's view, the death penalty 
is perfectly compatible with the notion that each human being 
has an absolute value. Indeed the precise function of punish- 
ment is to underscore and vindicate the value called into the 
question by the crime. Because homicide calls into question the 
value of life, the fitting response is, as the argument goes, the 
death penalty. 
C. The Death Penalty Decision and the Rule of Law 
What does this decision tell us about the rule of law in 
post-Communist Hungary? Some strict constructionists might 
argue that the Court obviously exceeded its mandate by ana- 
lyzing the relevant provision so boldly. That is not my view. 
Preliminarily, how do we know precisely what the mandate of 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court is? In my opinion, that 
mandate is being worked out as the Court takes bold steps, 
encounters criticism, and then either cuts back or goes forward 
with its innovations. It cannot be the case that at  all times, in 
all places, the rule of law demands only that judges apply stat- 
utes or their constitution precisely as written. As Romanian 
Professor Valeriu Stoica argued recently in Bucharest, the 
independence of judges does not require that they be reduced t o  
the servants of the written word!' The Communist conception 
of legality required that judges surrender their personalities t o  
the political view embodied in the statutory law. True indepen- 
dence, Stoica reasons, implies that judges think imaginatively 
and imovatively about the law they are called upon to inter- 
preto4' We ought not be overly critical of the judges of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court simply because they might 
have thought a little too creatively about the death penalty. 
The problem with the opinions in the Hungarian capital 
punishment decision is that they reflect a curious attitude 
toward the authority of the democratically-constituted Parlia- 
40. Valeriu Stoica, Address to the Bucharest Bar Association, May 1991. 
41. Id. 
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ment. Adjusting the distribution of power between the legisla- 
tive body and a court authorized to strike down legislation is 
central to any well-functioning democracy based on the rule of 
law. Yet this seems to be a problem that has not yet received 
due attention either in Hungary or in the other democracies of 
the region. This problem is familiar to American lawyers under 
the label "counter-majoritarian difficulty" and the imperative of 
judicial "deference" to the legislature. 
The peculiarity of Hungarian legal thinking on these issues 
is signaled by Judge Peter Schmidt's lone dissent in the capital 
punishment case!2 The opinion stresses a supposedly logical 
conflict between articles 54(1) and 8(2) of the Constitution. The 
former, quoted above, provides that "everyone has the inherent 
right t o  life and human dignity, of which no one shall be arbi- 
trarily depri~ed?~ The latter, relying upon the precedent of 
article 19 in the 1949 German Grundgesetz, provides that legis- 
lation may not encroach upon the "substantial contents of any 
fundamental right" secured under the Constitution!* That is, 
legislation may encroach upon the protected right at the edges, 
at the penumbra, but not at its core. Judge Schmidt perceived 
a contradiction between the two provisions. One holds that "ar- 
bitrary'' deprivation is categorically prohibited; the other seems 
to permit "arbitrary" deprivation in penumbral areas of the 
right of life. Judge Schmidt concludes that in view of this con- 
tradiction in the Constitution, the Constitutional Court should 
withhold decision and petition the Parliament to resolve the 
conflict between n0rms.4~ 
Judge Schmidt's deference to the legislature seems curious 
for Western lawyers, for they regard a perceived conflict be- 
tween norms not as problem requiring abstention, but rather 
as an opportunity for interpretation. Apparently, the perceived 
conflict did not bother the other nine Judges on the Court; they 
were willing to interpret away the conflict and base their deci- 
sion on article 54(1)." Judge Schmidt's position derives per- 
haps from a strict constructionist view that requires judges 
42. The Death Penalty Case, 107 1990 MK, U.T. at 11 (Schmidt, J., dissent- 
ing). 
43. A MAGYAR KCZZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 54, # 1 (Hung.). 
44. Id. art. 8, Q 2. 
45. The Death Penalty Case, 107 1990 MK, U.T. at 10-11 (Schmidt, J., dis- 
senting). 
46. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 54(1) (Hung.). 
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merely to apply the letter of the norm. This is impossible when 
there is apparent contradiction between norms. 
Because the Hungarian Constitution may be amended 
rather easily (a two-thirds vote of the single house of Parlia- 
ment):' it seems that whatever the Court does, the ultimate 
power rests with Parliament. Parliament can amend the Con- 
stitution as easily as the United States Congress can override a 
presidential veto. This feature of the Hungarian legal system 
creates the temptation to turn the duty of deference on its 
head. If it does not approve of a decision by the Court, Parlia- 
ment can always veto the Court's decision by amending the 
Constitution!" Parliament has shown its willingness to 
amend the Constitution dozens of times since October 1989. 
This disposition by Parliament may encourage the Court to 
press its influence as far as it can-at least until it runs into a 
parliamentary veto. Under this transposed state of affairs, the 
principle of deference requires an all-powerful Parliament to 
yield to the Court by not amending the Constitution. 
In a democratic legal system, however, the duty of defer- 
ence must run from the appointed judicial body to the elected 
legislative chamber. In a paternalist legal tradition, the danger 
is that a body of appointed experts-particularly academic 
experts-will think that they are true guardians of the nation's 
values. This is the danger today in Hungary's attempt to  merge 
the Western idea of judicial review with the principles of demo- 
cratic law-making. 
The quest for the rule of law in Eastern Europe has moved 
from the streets to the areas of political discourse and step-by- 
step dismantling of the Communist infra-structure in legal and 
political thought. The paternalist residue of Communist think- 
ing profiles the government in the taxi strike as a surrogate 
parent, in the V&&i dispute as a chiding teacher, and in the 
capital punishment dispute as a wise philosopher. To realize 
the rule of law, these images of government must gradually 
yield to a more modest conception of bureaucrats, legislators 
and judges. It is not that Hungarians genuinely respect their 
47. Id. art. 24, 3 3. 
48. See id. 
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leaders today, but aspects of their legal tradition promotes 
these unrealistic images of the personalities in power. The 
transition to the rule of law requires both a lowering of expec- 
tations in governmental officials and a corresponding trust in 
the legal institutions that take the place of personal and char- 
ismatic power. 
